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Abstract: This paper describes a design optimisation process applied to 
systems that require a high likelihood of functioning on demand. It is 
imperative that the best use of the available resources is made and an optimal 
rather than just an adequate system design is produced. The contribution of this 
research is in the development of an integrated approach which not only 
considers the primary system objective, availability of the system, but caters 
for all critical factors imperative to obtain an optimal system design. This 
research therefore combines the latest advantages of the fault tree analysis 
technique and the binary decision diagram method along with a multi-objective 
optimisation approach. The application area is a High Integrity Protection 
System of an offshore platform. The optimisation criteria involves unavailability, 
cost, spurious trip frequency and maintenance down time. The results produced 
using this method are compared to those obtained by exhaustive search. 
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1 Introduction 
Safety systems are designed to operate when certain conditions occur and to act to 
prevent their development into a hazardous situation. Failure of such a system or process 
may have severe consequences, possibly injuring members of the work force or public 
and occasionally resulting in loss of life. To minimise the likelihood of a hazardous 
situation, safety systems must be designed to minimise their unavailability. 
The majority of safety systems involve objective functions and constraints that  
are too complicated to manipulate using linear programming and classical optimisation 
techniques. The modern heuristic optimisation techniques (Rao, 1996) have proved  
to be more efficient and preferable for safety systems optimisation, which have integer 
variable design parameters, small search space regions, and linear and nonlinear 
objective function characteristics. Nowadays one of the most powerful optimisation 
method groups is Genetic Algorithms (GAs) (Goldberg, 1989). Other efficient techniques 
are Great Deluge, Threshold Accepting and Particle Swarm Optimisation (Rao, 1996). 
During the last decade a number of researchers have applied various methods for 
different safety system optimisations. Cantoni et al. (2000) used a simulation approach 
for optimal industrial plant design (to determine the choice of system layout and 
components) under conflicting safety and economic constraints. Marseguerra et al. 
(2004) proposed the multi-objective optimisation scheme for nuclear safety systems 
based on the effective coupling of genetic algorithms (MOGA) and Monte Carlo 
simulation. Martorell et al. (2004) considered a multiple-optimisation problem, where  
the parameters of design, testing and maintenance act as the design considerations.  
This problem was solved by several methods, with the best results obtained by the 
SPEA2-based MOGA. Everson and Fieldsend (2006) introduced the multi-objective 
optimisation based on GAs of safety related and critical systems. This research and 
others have shown the capability of the multi-objective approach and is the focus of  
this paper. 
This paper describes a design optimisation tool which yields an optimal safety system 
design by fully utilising available resources. The novel attributes of the method include 
the integration of reliability and optimisation methods into one automated tool. The High 
Integrity Protection System (HIPS) of an offshore platform has been chosen to test the 
effectiveness of the proposed optimisation technique, which combines the fault tree 
(Andrews and Moss, 2002), binary decision diagram (Rauzy, 1993) and multi-objective 
evolutionary methods. The paper considers the HIPS optimisation by the multi-objective 
improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Approach (SPEA2) (Zitzler, 2001) and compares 
results to those obtained by exhaustive search. Due to the multi-objective GAs universality, 
these methods often take less time to find the optimal solution than other multi-objective 
approaches and also require less computer resources (Sbalzarini et al., 2000). This 
advantage of the MOGAs helps to produce optimal results in a few minutes, which is 
very important for large safety systems. Considering these multi-objectives, with the 
results obtained for this application, show the advantages for safety system design. The 
algorithm developed has the potential to be applied to any safety system thus enabling 
effective analysis across a range of industrial domains. 
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The remainder of this paper is divided into four sections. The first overviews the 
optimisation technique. The second considers analysis of the example system and the 
implementation of the SPEA2 algorithm to the HIPS optimisation problem. The third 
discusses the results obtained from both the optimisation scheme and exhaustive search. 
The main conclusions are given in the final section. 
2 Optimisation technique 
The proposed optimisation technique can be described as a combination of fault tree 
analysis techniques, binary decision diagrams and the improved SPEA2. The fault trees 
are used to represent the system failure logic for each potential design (Section 2.1). 
Binary decision diagrams (Section 2.2) help to quantify the top event characteristics: 
unavailability and spurious trip frequency. The SPEA2 has been chosen for the system 
optimisation (Section 2.3). 
2.1 Fault tree analysis 
Fault Tree Analysis, first conceived in 1961 (Andrews and Moss, 2002), is one of  
the most powerful and widely used analytical techniques in the field of reliability 
engineering. It provides a well-accepted means of predicting the reliability of complex 
systems within the design optimisation algorithm. As no explicit objective function 
exists, fault trees are used to quantify the system unavailability. Each potential system 
design has an individual fault tree structure. However, it is an impractical task to 
construct separate fault trees for each design variation. This problem can be solved by 
including house events in the fault tree structure. House events are used to model two 
state events which either occur or do not occur, and, therefore, have probabilities 1 or 0. 
They provide a very effective means of turning sections of the fault tree on and off.  
One of the advantages of this is that the same fault tree can be used to model several 
scenarios. 
Figure 1 Example fault tree with house events 
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Figure 1 illustrates an example of a simple safety system, whose design may include two 
valves (A and B). The top event occurs if at least one of the valves fails. The house events 
(‘Valve A fitted’ and ‘Valve B fitted’) are used to represent the system design options. 
For example, if only valve A is fitted in the system, then the house event ‘Valve A fitted’ 
is set to true, i.e. assigned a probability of 1, ‘Valve B fitted’ is set to false, i.e. assigned a 
probability of 0. Therefore, the only way the safety system fails is from the contribution 
of valve A failing itself. 
2.2 Binary decision diagrams 
The conversion of the fault tree to the Binary Decision Diagram (BDD) format improves 
both the efficiency of determining the minimal cut sets of the fault tree and also the 
accuracy of the calculation procedure used to determine the top event parameters. 
A BDD can be described as a rooted, directed acyclic graph (Rauzy, 1993). Consider 
the example fault tree from Figure 1. If both house events ‘Valve A fitted’ and ‘Valve B 
fitted’ are true, i.e. have probability 1, the resulting binary decision diagram is as shown 
in Figure 2. All paths through the BDD start at the root vertex (A) and terminate in one of 
the two states, either 1 or 0. State 1 corresponds to the system failure, state 0, conversely, 
corresponds to a system success. Each BDD is composed of vertices, connected by 
branches, which are divided into terminal and non-terminal. Non-terminal vertices 
correspond to the basic events of the fault tree, i.e. vertex B for the example BDD  
(Figure 2). Vertices 1 and 0 are terminal. Qualitative and quantitative analysis of the 
BDD is described in detail by Rauzy (1993). 
Figure 2 Example binary decision diagram 
 
2.3 Multi-objective genetic algorithms 
SPEA2 is a relatively recent evolutionary technique for finding or approximating the 
optimal solution set for multi-objective optimisation problems. It was designed by Zitzler 
et al. (2001) and is an improved version of the (SPEA), developed by Zitzler and Thiele 
in 1998. Figure 3 represents the schematic of the SPEA2. 
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Figure 3 The schematic of the SPEA2 
 
The suggested algorithm (Figure 3) can be explained in six steps: 
Step 1 – Initialisation: Generate an initial population of potential designs and create the 
empty archive called external set. The resultant archive after the optimisation is 
complete will hold the set of best designs. 
Step 2 – Fitness assignment: Calculate the fitness value of each potential design in the 
initial population. This fitness value represents the suitability of the design given 
by the optimisation criteria. 
Step 3 – Environmental selection: Copy all non-dominated designs to the archive (given 
the optimisation is a minimisation problem, the non-dominated solutions are 
those which have at least one smallest optimisation parameter value). If the 
archive is exceeded reduce it by means of the truncation operator, otherwise fill 
the archive with dominated designs from the initial population. The number of 
designs contained in the archive is to remain constant over time. 
Step 4 – Termination: If the maximum number of generations is reached or another 
stopping criterion is satisfied then the set of possible designs are those in the 
archive. Algorithm complete. Else continue to Step 5. 
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Step 5 – Mating selection: Perform binary tournament selection with replacement on the 
archive in order to fill the mating pool (group of designs upon which genetic 
modification may occur), i.e.: 
(a) Randomly (using uniformly distributed random numbers) select two 
individuals out of the archive. 
(b) Copy the one with the better fitness value (i.e. lower for the HIPS 
optimisation problem) to the mating pool. 
(c) If the size of the mating pool is equal to the size of the archive, then stop, 
else go to Step (a). 
Step 6 – Variation: Apply recombination and mutation operators to the mating pool and 
set the archive to the resulting population (recombination is a process in which 
individual strings are copied according to their fitness values, and mutation is an 
operation that provides a random element in the search process). Increment 
generation counter and go to Step 2. 
3 Example safety system 
The High Integrity Protection System (HIPS) has been chosen to be optimised by the 
proposed technique. The structure of the system, failure data and design limitations are 
discussed in Section 3.1. Section 3.2 shows the application of the developed technique to 
the HIPS. 
3.1 HIPS structure 
The main function of the HIPS is to prevent a high-pressure surge passing through it. 
Protection is provided for processing equipment whose pressure rating could be exceeded. 
The high pressure originates from a production well of a not normally manned offshore 
platform and the pieces of equipment to be protected are located downstream on the 
processing platform. Figure 4 represents the main features of the HIPS (Andrews and 
Pattison, 1999). 
Figure 4 Structure of high-integrity protection system 
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HIPS is divided into two separate subsystems. Subsystem 1 is the Emergency Shutdown 
or ESD subsystem. This is the first level of protection of the HIPS. The ESD system acts 
to close the Wing and Master valves together with any ESD valves that have been fitted 
when pressure in the pipeline exceeds the permitted value. This value is monitored using 
Pressure Transmitters (PT). Subsystem 2 provides an additional level of protection. 
Inclusion of the high-integrity protection system incorporates this second level of 
redundancy. The latter sub-system is completely independent in operation. Its method of 
protection is the same as the ESD system. 
The HIPS is a relatively simple safety system yet the problem has ten main design 
variables. The number of potential designs considering these variables is 232, 257 and 
600. It is a complex task to understand the interaction between all the design variables 
and is practically impossible for any design engineer to do by hand. Hence, an 
optimisation technique is required. The ten design variables, their description and 
evaluation limits are shown in Table 1. 
Table 1 Main HIPS variables 
Variable Description Value 
θ1, θ2 Inspection intervals for subsystems 1 and 2 1 week – 2 years 
V Valve type 1 or 2 
P Pressure transmitter type 1 or 2 
N1, N2 Number of pressure transmitters fitted in subsystem 1 
and 2 respectively 
1–4 
0–4 
K1, K2 Number of pressure transmitters required to trip 
(activate) for subsystem 1 and 2 respectively 
1–N1, 
0–N2 
E Number of ESD valves fitted 0–2 
H Number of HIPS valves fitted 0–2 
It is assumed in the analysis that whatever valve type is selected all valves within  
the systems are fitted as this type. This is true of the pressure transmitter type also.  
In addition, the number of pressure transmitters required to activate the closure of valves 
on subsystem 1 or 2 is a function of the number installed ( 1N , 2N ). 
Failure data: Each component of the HIPS can fail either in a dormant mode or 
spuriously. A dormant failure can be described as the inability of the component to carry 
out its desired task on demand. In contrast, spurious failure results from the component 
carrying out its desired function when its operation is not required. Table 2 shows the 
failure rate and mean repair time for each HIPS component in both dormant and spurious 
failure modes. This data will be used subsequently when calculating the unavailability 
and spurious trip probability of the HIPS. 
Design limitations: Each combination of HIPS variables gives a new system design.  
The choice of system design is not unlimited. In this case, there are three limitations on 
the available resources. The total cost of the system must be less than one thousand units. 
The average time each year that the system resides in the down state due to preventative 
maintenance is a maximum of 130 hours. If the number of times that a spurious system 
shutdown occurs is more than once per year then it is deemed unacceptable. Hardware 
costs for each component in the system as well as times taken to service each component 
at each maintenance test are shown in Table 2. 
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Table 2 HIPS component failure data 
Component Dormant Failure Rate (p/h) Spurious Failure Rate (p/h) Cost Test Time (h) 
Wing Valve 1.14× 10−5 1× 10−6 100 12 
Master Valve 1.14× 10−5 1× 10−6 100 12 
HIPS Valve 1 5.44× 10−6 5× 10−7 250 15 
HIPS Valve 2 1× 10−5 1× 10−5 200 10 
ESDV Valve 1 5.44× 10−6 5× 10−7 250 15 
ESDV Valve2 1× 10−5 1× 10−5 200 10 
Solenoid Valve 5× 10−6 5× 10−7 20 5 
Relay Contacts 0.23× 10−6 2× 10−6 1 2 
PT 1 1.5× 10−6 1.5× 10−5 20 1 
PT 2 7× 10−6 7× 10−5 10 2 
Computer Logic 1× 10−5 1× 10−5 20 1 
Mean Repair Time = 36 hours 
3.2 HIPS optimisation 
The objective of the design optimisation problem for the HIPS application system is  
to minimise four system optimisation parameters (unavailability (Qsys), spurious trip 
frequency (Fsys), cost (Cost) and maintenance down time (MDT)) by manipulating the 
design variables such that limitations placed on them by constraints are not violated. 
Constraints involved in this problem fall into the category of either explicit or implicit 
constraints. The cost and maintenance down time can be represented by an explicit 
function of the design parameters. On the other hand, the system unavailability and the 
number of spurious trips can only be calculated by a full analysis of the system. The fault 
tree analysis techniques combined with binary decision diagrams for quantification are 
implemented. 
The C++ package was used to build the HIPS optimisation software called 
ISPEASSOP (Improved Strength Pareto Evolutionary Algorithm Safety System 
Optimisation Procedure). There are two main parts of the ISPEASSOP program. Part 1 is 
responsible for the HIPS structure and evaluation of the HIPS unavailability and spurious 
trip frequency. Part 2 is an implemented SPEA2 algorithm for the HIPS optimisation. 
Part 1 – HIPS structure: The top event of the HIPS unavailability fault tree represents the 
causes of the system failing to protect the processing equipment. The top event ‘Safety 
system fails to protect’ will occur if all (Wing, Master, ESD and HIPS) valves along the 
pipeline fail to close. In total the fault tree consists of 154 gates, 38 basic events 
representing component failures and 40 house events representing design options. 
The spurious trip frequency for each design is also an implicit constraint that requires 
the use of fault tree analysis to assess its value. House events are again used to construct 
a fault tree capable of representing each potential design for this failure mode. The causal 
relationship ‘HIPS fails spuriously’ is represented by the sub-events ‘Wing or Master 
Valve Fails Spuriously’, ‘ESD Subsystem Fails Spuriously’ and ‘HIPS Subsystem Fails 
Spuriously’ related by ‘OR’ logic. The fault tree consists of 142 gates, 38 basic events 
and 40 house events. 
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The corresponding house events within the fault tree are set to true or false for each 
design. The reduced fault tree is converted to the BDD for quantitative analysis. The 
probability values obtained from the analysis of the unavailability and spurious trip 
BDDs are used within the optimisation algorithm to select the best designs. 
Part 2 – Optimisation algorithm: The initial population (Step 1 of the algorithm) 
consisted of 20 strings. Each string represents a particular system design depending on 
the values assigned to each of its 10 parameters (Table 1), where each parameter is 
calculated according to the binary coding system. 
Each parameter must be allocated a particular length of the string, i.e. a particular 
number of bits, in order to accommodate the largest possible value in binary form. For 
example, the parameters governing the maintenance test interval for subsystems 1 and 2, 
1θ  and 2θ  respectively, require 14 bits (7 bits each) of the total string to accommodate 
the maximum time span of 104 weeks each. In total, each string representing all design 
variables is 32 bits in length. It can be interpreted as a set of concatenated integers in 
binary form (Figure 5). 
Figure 5 Binary representation of solution string 
 
The restricted range of values assigned to each parameter does not in each case 
correspond to the representative binary range on the solution string. For this reason a 
specialised procedure is used to code, to initialise and to check the feasibility of strings at 
each optimisation step. In the initialisation step feasible strings are randomly regenerated. 
Step 2 of the algorithm requires fitness assignment. Each fitness evaluation is 
dependent on the number of constraints: explicit and implicit. Explicit ones can be 
determined and easily evaluated from an explicit function of the design variables. Cost of 
the HIPS design is an explicit constraint and is represented by equations (1–3): 
Cost = Cost(subsys1)+Cost(subsys2) 1000   ≤ , (1) 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
( ) = ( )
( ) 261,
VE VE s
P P
Cost subsys1 E V C V C C
N PC P C
+ +
+ + +  (2) 
1 1 2 2
2 1 1 2 2
( ) = ( )
( ) 21
VH VH s
P P
Cost subsys2 H V C V C C
N PC P C
+ +
+ + +  (3) 
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where 11 VHVE CC =  is the cost of the valve type 1, 22 VHVE CC = is the cost of the valve 
type 2, 1PC  is the cost of the PT type 1, 2PC  is the cost of the PT type 2, and sC is the 
cost of the solenoid valves. The constant 261 [equation (2)] and 21 units [equation (3)] 
are fixed costs of both subsystems. 
Similarly, the average Maintenance Down Time (MDT) is calculated as a sum of the 
maintenance down time of subsystem 1 and subsystem 2 for each potential design 
[equations (4), (5) and (6)]: 
MDT = MDT(subsys1) + MDT(subsys2) 130   ≤ , (4) 
1 1 2 2
1 1 1 2 2
52( )= [ ( )
( ) 47],
VE VE S
P P
MDT subsys1 E V M V M M
N PM P M
θ + ++ + +
 (5) 
1 1 2 2
2 1 1 2 2
52( ) [ ( )
( ) 13].
VH VH S
P P
MDT subsys2 H V M V M M
N PM P M
θ= + ++ + +
 (6) 
where 11 VHVE MM =  is the test time of the valve type 1, 22 VHVE MM =  is the test time of 
the valve type 2, 1PM  is the test time of the pressure transmitter 1, 2PM  is the test time 
of the pressure transmitter 2 and SM  is the test time of the solenoid valve. The 
expression 52/ iθ  [equations (5) and (6)] gives the number of times the system is down in 
a year. The constant 47 [equation (5)] and 13 units [equation (6)] represents the sum of 
the test times for the fixed components in each subsystem. 
The constraints are incorporated into the optimisation by penalising the unavailability 
when violation occurs, as the most important factor for system functionality is to work on 
demand [the constraint penalties are explained in detail by Andrews and Pattison (1999)]. 
Therefore, the overall unavailability of each string consists of four parts: 
1 probability of the system failure, unavailability, Qsys 
2 penalty for exceeding the total cost constraint, Cp 
3 penalty for exceeding the total maintenance down time constraint, Mp 
4 penalty for exceeding the spurious trip constraint, Sp. 
Each penalty is subsequently added to the system unavailability. The resulting value is a 
penalised system unavailability 'sysQ , which participates in the optimisation procedure: 
pppsyssys SMCQQ +++=' . (7) 
Fitness assignment requires the division of the population of designs into dominated  
and non-dominated groups according to the following rules: since the optimisation is a 
minimisation problem, the design a dominates the design b if all a parameter values are 
equal to or smaller than b parameter values and at least one of parameter a values is 
smaller than the respective b parameter value. 
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The design a is non-dominated if there is no design in the population which 
dominates a. To avoid the situation that designs dominated by the same archive members 
have identical fitness values, for each individual both non-dominating and dominated 
solutions are taken into account. In detail, each design i in the archive and the population 
is assigned a strength value )(iS , representing the number of solutions it dominates. 
On the basis of the S values, the raw fitness )(iR of a design i is calculated. This 
fitness is determined by the strengths of its dominators in both the archive and 
population. Although the raw fitness assignment provides a sort of niching mechanism 
based on the concept of Pareto dominance, it may fail when most designs do not 
dominate each other. Hence, additional information is incorporated to discriminate 
between designs having identical raw fitness values. The density estimation technique 
used in SPEA2 is an adaptation of the k-th nearest neighbour method (Zitzler et al., 
2001), where the density at any point is a decreasing function of the distance to the k-th 
nearest data point. In this problem the inverse of the distance to the k-th nearest 
neighbour is taken as a density estimate ijσ , i.e. for each individual i the distances to all 
designs j in the archive and population are calculated using equation (8): 
2 2
' ' 2 2
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
( ( ) ( )) ( ( ) ( ))
i j C i C j MDT i MDT j
Q i Q j Fsys i Fsys j
σ = − + −
+ − + −  (8) 
where C(i) and MDT(i) are the cost and maintenance down time of the i-th design 
respectively, 'Q (i) and Fsys(i) are the i-th designs penalised system unavailability and 
spurious trip frequency respectively, j is from the interval [1,.., population size] with the 
condition that ≠i j . Obtained distances are stored in a list (matrix). After sorting the list 
in increasing order, the k-th element gives the distance sought, denoted as kiσ , where k  
is equal to the square root of the population size. Afterwards, the density ( )D i  
corresponding to i is defined by 
1( ) .
2ki
D i σ= +  (9) 
In the denominator, 2 is added to ensure that its value is greater that zero. Finally, adding 
( )D i  to the raw fitness value )(iR of the design i yields its fitness, Fitness (i): 
)()()( iDiRiFitness += . (10) 
The last step of the SPEA2 requires the application of the crossover and mutation 
operators to the mating pool. There are many different types of the crossover operator. 
The standard SPEA2 algorithms uses single-point crossover (Goldberg, 1989) which 
works through the following scheme: 
Step 1: A random number is generated. 
Step 2: If the generated number is smaller than the crossover rate, the pair of population 
strings j and j + 1 are crossed at the randomly chosen position. If not, step one 
repeats for the pair of strings j + 1 and j + 2. 
Step 3: If population end is not reached the process repeats from step one for the next 
string in the population. 
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A ‘modified’ method has been created for this application. It is similar to single-point 
crossover. The main difference appears at the third step, when consideration is given to 
the second parent string from the pair. This string can again participate in crossover as 
the first parent. This modification developed through progressive research results in 
diversity of the produced strings and, therefore, makes the search for the optimal solution 
faster. 
4 Results 
4.1 Optimisation results 
Two different optimisation schemes have been implemented to tailor the algorithm 
parameters for the HIPS system in order to evaluate the one that leads faster to the global 
optimal solution. In the first scheme, a single population of 20 strings have been 
generated and run through 3000 generations with the crossover and mutation rates equal 
to 0.7 and 0.01 respectively. The second scheme was based on 30 different initial 
populations with only 100 generations for each run of the ISPEASSOP with the same 
crossover and mutation rates. 
The first scheme resulted in a single Pareto set of non-dominated HIPS design 
options, on the other hand the second scheme gave 30 sets. A Pareto set obtained from 
the 20th run in the second scheme consisted of a larger number of non-dominated 
solutions by most optimisation parameter values and, therefore, has been chosen for 
comparison with the first optimisation scheme. Due to a large number of optimisation 
parameters the analysis of these results has been carried out for each group of two. 
Figures 6 (a–f) show the comparison of resulting Pareto fronts in two-dimensional space 
(where scheme 1 points are represented using a × and a° for scheme 2). 
All the Figure 6 plots show that both optimisation schemes produced very similar 
Pareto fronts, however, the front obtained by the first scheme produces a larger number 
of the boundary points (design solutions) due to a larger number of generations. 
Observation of the data itself shows that the 1st scheme produces up to 4 additional non-
dominated designs. Figure 6(a) indicates that the higher maintenance down time values 
are directly proportional to the system cost values. Figure 6(b) illustrates that with an 
increase in cost comes a decrease in spurious trip frequency, however, at just below  
600 cost units further increase does not improve the reduction in inappropriate action of 
the system. Figure 6(c) shows the relationship between cost and unavailability. A log 
scale has been used to represent the unavailability due to the large deviation in values 
produced. As cost is increased the effect is to improve the unavailability values. Higher 
maintenance down time values lead to a smaller system unavailability [Figure 6(e)]. 
Figure 6(d) shows that there is no clear relationship between spurious trip frequency 
maintenance down time. Figure 6(f) shows that there is again not a strong relationship 
between spurious trip and unavailability, however, values of 0.45 spurious trip 
occurrences per year produces the smallest unavailability. 
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Figure 6 Pareto front in two-dimensional space 
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(c) Qsys and Cost Pareto front (d) Fsys and MDT Pareto front 
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(e) Qsys and MDT Pareto front (f) Qsys and Fsys Pareto front  
4.2 Exhaustive search results 
For a system required to work on demand the system unavailability is one of the most 
important optimisation criterion. Therefore, in order to check the performance of the 
schemes from Section 4.1 in terms of system unavailability, an exhaustive search has 
been produced. Given the total number of potential HIPS designs equals 232, 257, 600, 
the whole exhaustive search required almost 38 hours. Evidence showed a difference 
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between the values of the unavailability obtainable with constraints removed. Figure 7 
represents the comparison of the smallest actual (with constraints removed) and feasible 
(obtained from the design, with optimisation parameters within their limitations, 
discussed in Section 3.1) for system unavailability obtained during the search when 
considering maintenance test intervals for subsystem 1. 
Figure 7 Comparison of the actual and feasible minimal Qsys obtained by exhaustive search 
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As it might be seen from Figure 7, the smallest actual system unavailability  
(Qsys = 2.884e-7) has been obtained in the first group (θ1 = 1 week), however, the 
design corresponded to this value is infeasible due to a large value of maintenance down 
time (MDT = 2028 h). The value of the smallest system unavailability has the tendency 
to increase when the maintenance interval θ1 becomes larger. The smallest feasible 
unavailability value is Qsys = 4.051e-7. The difference between the actual and feasible 
values increases when the maintenance interval becomes larger. 
The comparison of the best results obtained during experiments described in  
Section 4.1 to the best HIPS design obtained by exhaustive search is shown in Table 3. 
This table shows that both optimisation schemes produced designs with unavailability 
values close to the one obtained by exhaustive search, however, the second scheme 
resulted in a smaller value. Other optimisation parameter values are similar in all  
cases. The first scheme produces smaller MDT (128.40 h) and system cost (632 units)  
values, on the other hand the second scheme resulted in smaller spurious trip frequency 
(0.45027 times). All three designs are very similar. In all cases the first subsystem has no 
ESD valves (E) and the subsystem 2 consists of only 1 HIPS valve (H). The dominated 
value for pressure transmitters fitted (N1/N2) and required (K1/K2) is 2. All designs  
are constructed of the first type of valve (V) and pressure transmitter (P) type. The 
maintenance interval for subsystem 1 (θ1) is close to 17, and the maintenance interval  
θ2 varies from 60 to 127. Other optimisation parameter values are also very similar for 
all three designs. Since the optimisation technique searches for the optimal solutions in 
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terms of four objectives, the likelihood of the resulting design with the smallest global 
unavailability is reduced. However, the obtained results prove the good performance of 
the developed tool, which produces an optimal solution close to the global minimum in 
only 20 minutes (for 3000 system evaluations). 
Looking at the unavailability values for each of the optimisation schemes shows that 
in both experiments the majority of unavailability values are close to the feasible smallest 
value produced by the exhaustive search. The minimal unavailability values concentrate 
in the intervals [4.235e-7, 1e-6) and [4.143e-7, 6e-7) for the first and second schemes 
respectively. Despite the relatively small number of generations, the second optimisation 
scheme provided larger diversity between potential HIPS designs and leaded to a smaller 
system unavailability. 
Table 3 Results comparison 
Subsystem Exhaustive Search 1st Scheme 2nd Scheme 
1 No. of ESD valves, E 0 0 0 
 No. of PTs, N1 2 2 3 
 No. of PTs to trip, K1 2 2 2 
 Maintenance test interval, θ1 17 19 18 
2 No. of HIPS valves, H 1 1 1 
 No. of PTs, N2 2 2 3 
 No. of PTs to trip, K2 2 2 2 
 Maintenance test interval, θ2 127 60 93 
Valve type (V) 1 1 1 
PT type (P) 1 1 1 
MDT 129.53 128.40 129.53 
Cost 632 632 652 
Spurious trip occurrence (Fsys) 0.45045 0.45044 0.45027 
System unavailability (Qsys) 4.051e-7 4.235e-7 4.143e-7 
5 Conclusions 
The research has demonstrated the applicability of a multi-objective approach to safety 
system design optimisation, in particular in the offshore domain. Comparative analysis  
to a single objective approach has shown the benefits of addressing all objectives and 
ultimately highlights the way forward for future design optimisation analysis. 
An automated robust design optimisation process has been developed. Integration  
of more traditional reliability techniques, with the optimisation algorithm, has produced  
a new optimisation tool. The adequacy of the system performance in terms of 
unavailability calculation is assessed using the fault tree analysis technique. The causes 
of failure for each possible design alternative are represented by a single fault tree by 
using house events. The use of the BDD technique allows the solution of the fault tree in 
the most efficient manner. 
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Two different schemes of SPEA2 have been successfully applied to a High Integrity 
Protection System (HIPS) and produced good results for system design optimisation.  
In both cases, the multi-objective approach produced a set of potential designs to be 
selected on the most important parameters. In both cases results were close to those 
obtained by exhaustive search. The first scheme provided a more accurate Pareto front 
due to a larger number of generations. On the other hand, the second scheme benefits 
from a larger diversity among possible design options and, therefore, leads to smaller 
optimisation parameter values. 
Another important advantage of the SPEA2 is that it is fast and allows optimal 
solutions to be produced in only a few minutes time, hence, requires less memory 
resources. 
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